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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Past research traditionally has adopted a static, cross-sectional approach
in assessing the net effect of immigrants on the economy's fiscal posi-
tion. But this approach is inadequate, for it fails to account for the future
impact of current immigrants and their offspring. To overcome this short-
coming and avoid misleading conclusions, a dynamic analysis is neces-
sary. The recently developed tool of generational accounting provides
an ideal framework for such analysis, for it also permits a comparison of
the fiscal effects of immigration policy with those of other policies.
This paper amends and then applies the technique of generational
accounting to measure the fiscal effects of immigration. Among its find-
ings are:
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The recent improvement in the U.S. fiscal picture reduces the poten-
tial fiscal benefits of immigration. With future generations projected to
bear a lower net fiscal burden than under previous forecasts, there is less
to be gained by sharing this burden with new immigrants.
Changes in the level of immigration have an uncertain effect on
fiscal balance, with the sign dependent on parameter choices and as-
sumptions. However, the effect, whether positive or negative, is small
in magnitude relative to the overall U.S. fiscal imbalance.
Of greater potential fiscal importance are changes in the composition
of the immigrant population, in particular with respect to educational
attainment.
Thus, to the extent that the debate over immigration policy has fo-
cused on the level rather than the composition of the immigrant popula-
tion, this attention may have been misplaced.
1. INTRODUCTION
As a "nation of immigrants," the United States has experienced ebbs and
flows both in the rate of immigration and in the attitudes of its citizens
toward new immigrants. In recent years, the renewed strength of immi-
gration to the United States has sparked a debate about the economic
effects of immigration, focusing primarily on effects in the labor market
(e.g., Card, 1996) and fiscal effects.
The debate over the fiscal burdens imposed by immigration culmi-
nated in such events as the November 1996 vote by California's elector-
ate in favor of Proposition 187, a measure which, had it not been tied up
in litigation, would have denied illegal immigrants and their children
access to public assistance, social services, health care, and,notably,
public education. But while some have seen immigrants as a fiscal drain,
others have seen them as a potential solution to the fiscal pressures of an
aging population: as a new source of taxpayers to keep the unfunded,
age-based U.S. social insurance system of social security and Medicare
from collapsing. In the face of such conflicting perspectives, only a quan-
titative analysis can determine the net fiscal effect of immigration. Such
an analysis is one of this paper's goals.
Research in this area [surveyed in National Research Council (NRC),
1997, Chapter 6] traditionally has adopted a static, cross-sectional ap-
proach in assessing the new effect of immigrants on the economy's fiscal
position. But such calculations are inadequate, for they do not take into
account the future consequences of short-term changes in the level of
immigration. For example, consider the cases of public education and so-
cial security. From cross-section analysis, a large population of school-age
immigrants might appear to add fiscal pressure via added expenditures.Fiscal Effects of U.S. Immigration125
But this calculation ignores the subsequent income taxes paid by these
same immigrants in their adulthood, as well as by their native offspring,
payments that might more than compensate for the increased spending.
On the other hand, while a large working-age immigrant population
might appear to lessen the fiscal burden of a pay-as-you-go social security
system, these immigrants wifi eventually receive benefits from the same
system, benefits that could exceed the taxes they paid in present value.
To overcome these shortcomings and avoid misleading conclusions, a
dynamic analysis that takes the future consequences of immigration into
account is necessary. A recent such analysis for the United States (NRC,
1997, Chapter 7, based largely on Lee and Mifier, 1997) reached the
conclusion that U.S. immigrants provide a net fiscal benefit in present
value when account is taken of their own effect on tax receipts, transfers,
and government purchases, as well as that of their descendents. While
we use many of the data and projections from that research, we go
beyond them in several respects.
First, we consider the effects of the recent changes in the U.S. fiscal
outlook. Based on the more pessimistic fiscal projections of the time, the
NRC study's results incorporated the assumption that the future would
bring the tax increases and/or benefit cuts needed to stabilize the na-
tional debt. Without such measures of fiscal stringency, the fiscal bene-
fits of a larger group of future taxpayers may be reduced or eliminated.
Second, we consider the impact of a changing immigration mix, in
particular a change in the educational status of the immigrant popula-
tion. Many of the critics of current U.S. immigration policy (e.g., Borjas,
1994) have argued that it is not the recent rise in immigration per Se, but
rather the decline in the earnings ability of immigrants, that is the source
of pressure.
Finally, applying more fully an approach we used in our earlier paper
(Auerbach and Oreopoulos, 1999), we perform our dynamic analysis us-
ing the techniques of generational accounting introduced by Auerbach,
Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991) and applied subsequently by a number of
others. Generational accounting allows us to go beyond calculations of
the net impact of immigrants, to consider the impact of changes in immi-
gration policy on the relative burdens of different age cohorts, and to
compare the fiscal effects of immigration policy with those of other poli-
cies. This last comparison is useful in helping us judge the quantitative
significance of changes in immigration policy.
Another of the paper's contributions is its adaptation of the genera-
tional accounting methodology to accommodate the presence of inmü-
grants and immigration. In the past, generational accounts have typically
ignored immigration, treating population changes resulting from immi-
gration as if they resulted from a decline in mortality among natives in the126Auerbach & Oreopoulos
immigrant's generation. That is, all members of a given generation at each
age were treated as survivors among the original U.S. residentsof that
generation. Thus, each generation's account included the projected taxes
and transfers of subsequent immigrants of the same cohort and therefore
did not reflect the net fiscal burdens of current residents of that genera-
tion. For example, if immigrants were primarily aged and received certain
old-age benefits, these benefits would have been treated as additional
transfer payments to current residents, leading to an understatement of
the typical resident's lifetime fiscal burden. For countries with significant
immigrant populations, such a procedure could provide a distorted pic-
ture of the fiscal burdens of current generations and hence of the gap
between current and future generations implied by a given fiscal policy.
Because of the importance of this change in methodology, we begin
our analysis with a description of the new approach togenerational
accounting and a comparison of this approach and the previous one.
After discussing our data sources, we turn to an analysis of the effects of
U.S. immigration on fiscal balance and generational burdens. Among
our results are:
The recent improvement in the U.S. fiscal picture reduces the poten-
tial fiscal benefits of immigration. With future generations projected
to bear a lower net fiscal burden than under previous forecasts, there
is less to be gained by sharing this burden with new immigrants.
Changes in the level of immigration have an uncertain effect on fiscal
balance, with the sign dependent on parameter choices and assump-
tions. However, the effect, whether positive or negative, is small in
magnitude relative to the overall U.S. fiscal imbalance.
Of greater potential fiscal importance are changes in the composition of
the immigrant population, in particular with respect to educational
attainment.
Thus, to the extent that the debate over inimigration policy has fo-
cused on the level rather than the composition of the immigrant popula-
tion, this attention may have been misplaced.
2. GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTING: EXISTING
METHODOLOGY
We begin with a brief review of the standard generational accounting
methodology. For further discussion, the reader is referred to Auerbach,
Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991) or Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1999).Generational accounting is basedon the government's intertemporal
budget constraint. This constraint, writtenas equation (1), requires that
the present value of all future net taxpayments made by current and
future generations be sufficient tocover the present value of future
government consumption as well as service the government's initialnet
indebtedness1:
5=
N1,_, + EN1 +(1 + r)5=E G5(1 + T)1t- Wf.
s=1 5=1 (1)
The first summation on the left side of (1) adds togetherthe generational
accounts (the present value of the remaining lifetimenet payments) of
existing generations. The termN1,_5 stands for the account of the genera-
tion born in year t - s. The index s in this summationruns from age 0 to
age D, the maximum length of life.2
The second summation on the left side of (1) addstogether the present
values of remaining net payments of futuregenerations, with s represent-
ing the number of years afteryear t that the generation is born. The
summation on the right side of (1) expresses the present value ofgovern-
ment consumption. In this summation the value ofgovernment con-
sumption in each year s, G,, is discounted by the pretax realinterest rate
r. The remaining term on the right side, W, is the government'snet
wealth in year tits assets minus its explicit debt.As in past applica-
tions, we ignore real government assets and the offsettingflows from
such assets in calculating W and G5, respectively,so that - W reduces to
the value of government debt.
Equation (1) indicates the zero-sum nature of intergenerationalfiscal
policy. Holding the present value of government consumptionfixed, a
reduction in the present value of net taxes extracted fromcurrent gen-
erations [a decline in the first summation on the left side of (1)]necessi-
tates an increase in the present value of net taxpayments of future
generations.
The accountNIk is defined by
k+D
NIk =TSkPSk(l + (2)
5K
1 The constraint does notassume that government debt is ever fully paid off, merely that
the debt grows less quickly than the rate of discount, i.e., it doesnot explode. Thus, it is
consistent with the long-run existence of government deficits,as long as these deficits are
smaller than the amount needed simply to service the level of outstandingdebt.
2 Hence, the first term of this summation isN11, which is the present value of net payments
of the generation born in year t; the last term is Nt,t_D, thepresent value of remaining net
payments of the oldest generation alive in year t, namely those born inyear t - D.
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where K = max(t,k). For generations born prior to yeart, the summation
begins in year t. For generations born in yeark > t, the summation
begins in year k.
In expression (2), T,,k stands for the projected averagenet tax payment
made to the government in year s by a memberof the generation born in
year k, ands,kstands for the number of residents in year s belongingto
the cohort born in year k. As discussedabove, the traditional genera-
tional accounting methodology treats each ofthese as survivors of those
present in year k; immigrants havetheir taxes and transfers attributed to
natives of the same cohort.
A set of generational accounts is simply a setof values of Nt,k, one for
each existing and future generation, with theproperty that the com-
bined present value adds up to the right side ofequation (1). Though we
distinguish male and female cohorts in the resultspresented below, we
suppress sex subscripts in equation(1) and (2) to ease notation.
Note that generational accounts reflect only taxespaid less transfers
received. With the occasional exception of governmentexpenditures on
education, the accounts presented in pastresearch typically have not
imputed to particular generations the value of thegovernment's pur-
chases of goods and services. Therefore, the accountsdo not show the full
net benefit or burden that any generationreceives from government pol-
icy as a whole, although they canshow a generation's net benefit or
burden from a particular policy change thataffects only taxes and trans-
fers. Thus generational accounting tells uswhich generations wifi pay for
government spending rather than telling uswhich generations wifi bene-
fit from that spending. Another characteristicof generational accounting
is that, like deficit accounting, it does not incorporateinduced behavioral
effects or macroeconomic responses of policychanges.3 As a corollary, it
does not incorporate the deadweight lossof taxation in its measure of
fiscal burden, again following the tradition ofbudget incidence analysis.
The left side of equation (1) is estimatedassuming current projected
fiscal policy and then compared with theright side. If the sum of the
current and future generational accounts issmaller in present value than
total future government consumption andinitial net debt, current policy
is unsustainable and a policy that adjusts atleast part of the equation is
For further discussion, see Fehr and Kotlikoff(1999), who use the AuerbachKotlikoff
simulation model to assess the effect of general-equilibriumeffects on generational
accounts. They find that the accounts typicallyprovide a good approximation of the full
general-equilibrium effect. Integrating our disaggregated accountsinto a general-equili-
brium model is an interesting topic for future research.Progress in this direction has
been made by Storesletten (2000), who incorporates threeskill classes of immigrants in an
AuerbachKotlikOff-type simulation model to study the impact of changesin the immigra-
tion mix on U.S. fiscal balance.Fiscal Effects of U.S. Immigration129
required. Of course, there is no unique way to make this adjustment.
Our base case assumes that any residual amount needed to satisfy the
government's budget constraint wifi be borne entirely by future genera-
tions. The traditional approach has been to spread this burden among
future generations in such a way that the average present-value lifetime
net tax payment per initial member of each future generation is constant
except for productivity growth. Again, the old methodology did not
allow for the fact that some of these taxes would actually be paid by




To take explicit account of the effect of immigrants, we rewrite equation
(1), breaking its components into those attributable to immigrants and
those attributable to natives:
D
+ + F,+)(1 + rys =G(1 + r)t - w(3)
s=O s1 s=t
where we now define to be the account of the native generation born
in year ts, and define to be the account for all others born in year
ts. Equation (2) still provides the definition of N,k, now the factors TSk
represent the net tax payments for natives, and the population levelssk
stand for the number of natives born in year k that survive at least until
year s. Thus, the two sets of terms Ft,k in equation (3) represent, respec-
tively, the accounts for all immigrants to existing cohorts and the ac-
counts for all immigrants to future cohorts. That is,
k+D
Ftk = YTk 1s,k (1 + r), (4)
5K
where, as in (2),K =max(t ,k),and where T,k is the projected per capita net
tax payment and kis the number of residents in years for the immigrant
generation born in year k. The evolution ofk overtime (i.e., holding k
fixed and varying s) wifi reflect not only mortality, but also additional
immigration and emigration of previous immigrants. Values of Tk wifi
typically differ from those of natives. Indeed, this difference is a cru-
cial element of the debate over the fiscal effects of immigrants. We return
to this issue below, after discussing data sources and methodology.
Because the accounts defined by equation (4) incorporate the net taxes130 Auerbach & Oreopoulos
resulting from additional immigration after year K, there is no simple
way to divide them by the associated year-K populationto produce
generational accounts that are comparable to the per capita accounts of
natives.4 Thus, one should view the construction of the accounts in (4)
primarily as a necessary step in deriving correct accounts for natives.
Given adequate data, calculation of the burdens on existing genera-
tions remains straightforward after this decomposition: we simply allo-
cate burdens to natives and immigrants based on the taxes and transfers
attributable to each group. However, for future generations, which the
standard methodology treats as a residual group, there is no obvious
analogy to the procedure used in the no-immigrant case. We can no
longer simply assign to each future native generation the same (adjusted
for growth) per capita generational account, for this leaves open the
question of what adjustment should be imposed on future immigrants.
One approach might be to extend the current assumption used to
distinguish future burdens by sex, requiring that the percentage per
capita increase in generational accounts be the same for natives and
immigrants.5 But this is unappealing given that immigrants have a very
different population structure than natives. It seems implausible that
any realistic policy to raise the fiscal burdens on future generations
would have the same percentage effect on the lifetime fiscal burdens of
natives and immigrants. Immigrants inherently have a different lifetime
pattern of U.S. residence and hence of U.S. taxes and transfers. Indeed,
as immigrants arrive at different ages, it is not even clear how they
should be aggregated to perform such a calculation.
To deal with this problem, we propose an alternative method of assign-
ing the residual. The method involves first calculating the burdens on
future generations (both native and immigrant) under current policy,
specifying some combination of tax and transfer instruments to be ad-
justed, and then adjusting these instruments proportionally for future
generations until equation (3) is satisfied. This allocation of the extra
burden on future generations typically will yield different percentage
increases for men and women, and for natives and immigrants, but wifi
' For example, because essentially all first-generation immigrants arrive after age 0, their
aggregate age-0 account is attributable to net taxes paid by individuals not in the popula-
tion as of age 0; the per capita generational account would appear to be infinite.
A recent analysis using generational accounting to study immigration in Germany
(Bonin, Raffelhuschen, and Walliser, 1998) did rely on such an assumption. That paper
also assumed that the age structure of immigrants among future generations was the same
as that of current immigrants, an assumption that we do not make here.Fiscal Effects of U.S. Immigration131
be based on a concrete change in actual policy variables. Because the
allocation also depends on the tax or transfer components being ad-
justed, we consider different policy combinations, namely, proportional
increases in all taxes, proportional decreases in all transfers, or the combi-
nation of the two (with the same proportional changes in taxes and
transfers). We also consider making the proportional adjustment of
taxes and transfers immediately, so that the new policy affects current as
well as future generations.
4. DATA SOURCES
Construction of generational accounts requires population data and pro-
jections, tax and transfer profiles for different demographic groups
within each cohort, projections for the path of government purchases, a
value for the initial stock of government debt, and assumption about the
government's discount rate.
For much of this, we rely on the assumptions and data used in the
recently-published calculation for the United States by Gokhale, Page,
and Sturrock (1999, hereafter GPS). However, we substitute more recent
aggregate projections provided by one of the authors, John Sturrock,
based on the spring 1999 CBO long-run forecast. These aggregate projec-
tions generate a considerably smaller fiscal imbalance than was reported
by GPS, whose projections we used in an earlier paper (Auerbach and
Oreopoulos, 1999). The new data set includes aggregate projections for
the growth of government spending G and aggregate taxes and transfers
through the year 2070. We assume that aggregate taxes and transfers
grow with labor productivity after 2070 at a real per capita rate of 1.2
percent. For government purchases after 2070, we benchmark age-based
profiles of government spending used by Auerbach, Gokhale, and
Kotlikoff (1991) to the 2070 aggregate, and assume that these profiles
grow with the rate of labor productivity thereafter. Thus, government-
spending growth is permitted to deviate from the general growth rate to
the extent that there are shifts in the age structure of the population.
Finally, we follow GPS in assuming a 1.2-percent rate of labor productiv-
ity growth after 2070, and a real discount rate of 6 percent. As we adopt a
base year of 1998 instead of 1995, we use an updated value of W = 2.0
trillion.
As to tax and transfer profiles, GPS disaggregate only by sex, and not
by nativity, and so we must supplement them with data from another
source. Tax and transfer policies broken down by nativity, but not by
sex, come from estimates by Lee and Miller (1997). We apply an algo-132Auerbach & Oreopoulos
rithm, described in the appendix, to combine the two sets of profiles to
generate tax and transfer profiles by both sex and nativity.6 As the appen-
dix also discusses, we then use further information about how these
profiles vary by educational status to adjust the profiles of future mimi-
grants to take account of changes over time in the composition of the
immigrant population.
For population projections, we simply use an alternative source that
provides information at a more disaggregate level. These alternative
population projections were provided by Barry Edmonston based on an
adaptation of the population projection model in NRC (1997, Appendix
3.A). The model generates annual population projections through the
year 2100, broken down by age, sex, and nativity,the last of which has
three categories: first-generation immigrants, second-generation immi-
grants (i.e., native children of immigrants), and all others, to whom
we refer simply as natives. We assume a stationarypopulation after
2100. Like the profiles by immigrant status, which in principle cover all
foreign-born individuals and not just legal immigrants, the estimated
immigrant population includes not only legal immigrants, but ifiegal
immigrants as well.8
5. INITIAL RESULTS: EFFECTS OF THE CHANGE
IN METHODOLOGY
Table 1 presents generational accounts constructed under different as-
sumptions, to illustrate the effects of the changes in methodology just
described. For each simulation, the table presents the generational ac-
counts for existing generations of males and females at five-year inter-
vals and the accounts for future generations implied by the need to
satisfy intertemporal fiscal balance. Our base year is 1998; those born in
1998 represent age 0 in the table, and future generations begin with
those born in 1999.
The first two columns present the accounts for males and females
6The algorithm requires additional assumptions regarding relative patterns across nativity
groups. We choose the restriction that the malefemale ratio (percapita) for each tax and
transfer component is constant at each age across the three nativity groups. For example,
we assume that the ratio of income taxes per age-46 male to income taxes perage-46 female
is the same for first-generation immigrants, second-generation immigrants, and natives.
Whether we specify the population to be constant after 2100 or 2200 does not significantly
alter our results, because the generational accounting methodology assigns relatively little
weight to the distant future.
8For further discussion, see NRC (1997, pp. 88, 306). The hypothetical no-immigrant
experiment considered below eliminates all immigrant, legal and illegal.Fiscal Effects of U.S. Immigration133
based on the traditional methodology, using the aggregate male and
female tax and transfer profiles from GPS, the updated aggregate projec-
tions, and our alternative population projections. The accounts for exist-
ing generations show the standard pattern, higher in general for men
than women and rising and then falling with age as taxes and then
transfers because a more significant factor. They also show an imbalance
between current and future generations of just 8.5 percent, down sub-
stantially from the 72-percent imbalance found by GPS. Part of the expla-
nation lies in our faster projected population growth. With initial debt
and projected growth in government purchases through 2070 given,
higher population translates into lower per capita burdens. As discussed
in our earlier paper, this change from the assumptions of GPS, alone,
would reduce the fiscal imbalance from 72 percent to 54 percent. How-
ever, the remaining drop is due entirely to the sharp improvement in the
fiscal picture embodied in the newer aggregate projections.
The next set of calculations shows the effect of the alternative method
of allocating the residual burden to future generations, by cutting all
transfers and increasing all taxes in a proportional manner. The accounts
in these columns still aggregate the taxes and transfers of immigrants
with those of natives. Because the only change here is in the allocation of
burden among future generations, the accounts for existing generations
are unchanged. Listed below the accounts for current generations are
the percentage increase in taxes and cut in transfers, as well as the cor-
responding percentage increases, relative to current newborns, in the
accounts of future generations of males and females.
Note that the percentage increases in the generational accounts are no
longer equal for males and females, because the new methodology ad-
justs taxes and transfers, rather than overall burdens, proportionally. As
can be seen by inspection of equation (2) and the definition of the net tax
payment TSk, increasing the accounts proportionally, regardless of the
pattern of taxes and transfers, would require an equal percentage increase
in all taxes and an equal percentage increase in all transfers.9 Moreover,
this approach doesn't necessarily impose an equal per capita net tax bur-
den (adjusted for growth) on all future generations. Even though tax and
transfer profiles are the same, changes in mortality (and, in this simula-
tion, inunigration patterns as well) wifi cause different generations to
have different lifetime tax burdens. Thus, the "future generation" listed
Indeed, the traditional approach, in implicitly raising taxes and raising transfers propor-
tionally, can lead to strange results. For example, if current newborn males have positive
generational accounts and females have negative generational accounts, and burdens must







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in the table refers to the first future generation only, the cohort born in
1999. Given the change in methodology, there is no assurance that the
burden on future generations wifi be the same as in the first simulation,
and indeed, the burdens on future males and females born in 1999 are
projected to be higher here for both males and females. The explanation
for this increase lies primarily in the fact that members of later genera-
tions are projected to live longer. As longer life translates into an in-
crease in transfer payments and hence a decline in net taxliabilities, a
greater share of the fiscal burden must be placed on the initial future
generations, while the burden on later generations wifi be smaller.
The third set of calculations presented in the table illustrates the further
effects of distinguishing immigrants from others in the population.1° It
presents the generational accounts for natives based on equation (3), for
the case in which the generational accounts of first- and second-gener-
ation immigrants are calculated separately. Before discussing these re-
sults, it is useful to look at the tax and transfer profiles underlying them.
Profiles for immigrants and natives, derived from two different data
sources using the algorithm described in the appendix, aredisplayed in
Figures 1 through 3. The figures present, for males and females sepa-
rately, the age profiles for all per capita taxes, transfers, and taxes net of
transfers, respectively.
As the figures show, differences between immigrants and natives are
more significant on the tax side than on thetransfer side. Indeed, we
note from Figure 2a and b that while first-generation immigrants do
receive more transfer payments per capita than natives in middle age,
they actually receive less in old age. This is primarily due to lower
social security benefits resulting from lower covered lifetime wages. On
the other hand, taxes are substantially lower for first-generation immi-
grants than for natives (Figure la and b), and this carries over into the
net tax profiles (Figure 3a and b). Perhaps surprising is the position of
the net tax profiles of second-generation immigrants above those of
natives. While one would expect assimilation to bring these second-
generation profiles above those of first-generation immigrants, their
observed position suggests that today's second-generation immigrants
and today's first-generation immigrants differ by more than just time
since immigration. Thus, it may be inappropriate to use these profiles
in projections for the future second-generation children of today's first-
generation immigrants. We return to this issue shortly, when we discuss
10 The program used to produce these simulations, written to run using MATLAB version
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the derivation of the adjusted second-generation profiles also shown in
Figure 3a and b.
Looking again at the third set of results in Table 1, we note that the
accounts for current generations do not follow a consistent pattern rela-
tive to those in the previous two methods, based on aggregate native
and immigrant populations. The changes we do observe reflect the differ-
ences between the native profiles in Figure 3a and b and the aggregate
profiles used in the earlier tables. However, given the predominance of
natives in the population, the difference in profiles is not large. A second
source of difference in the two methods of computing generational ac-
counts is the fact that the populations used previously include varying
shares of natives and immigrants at different ages. In particular, as
Figure 4 shows, the immigrant share of the elderly in the base year is
higher than that for the general population; a similar pattern exists for
later years. Because the elderly are net transfer recipients, the previous
methodology tends to overstate the transfers expected by those in mid-
dle age, for it attributes to a primarily native group the future transfers
received by both natives and immigrants. This explains why the ac-
counts in this third set of columns are higher in middle age.
Thus, considering immigrants and natives separately does affect our
estimates of generational accounts. However, because this methodology
also separates immigrants from future generations of natives, the net
effect of the correction on our estimate of generational imbalance is
minor. This can be seen by comparing the entries for the "% difference"
for males and females and the "% change" in taxes and transfers with
those corresponding to the previous case, which did not separate inuni-
grants and natives.
Before considering the effect of immigration itself, we implement one
further change in methodology. As the discussion of the profiles in
Figures 1-3 just noted, the characteristics of recent immigrants may be
an inaccurate guide to the characteristics of future immigrants. In par-
ticular, given the important change in the mix of immigrants since the
1965 repeal of national-origin quotas that favored immigration from
Europe, the second-generation children of the past few decades' first-
generation immigrants may have very different characteristics from the
second-generation immigrants of today. If these future second-genera-
tion immigrants have lower skills and hence lower tax profiles than
simple extrapolation suggests, we may understate the size of the exist-
ing fiscal imbalance (for future natives will have to shoulder more of the
burden) and, more importantly for our purposes, overstate the fiscal
benefits of immigration. To avoid this, we adjust the profiles of future40 -
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FIGURE 4. Share of Immigrants (First and Second Generation) in
Total Population, 1998
second-generation immigrants in the following manner, which we de-
scribe briefly here and in more detail in the appendix.
We utilize an alternative set of population projections provided by
Barry Edmonston, corresponding to the case in which all new immigrants
to the United States ceases after the year 2000. This set of projections takes
account not oly of the direct effect of a drop in first-generation immi-
grants, but also drop in the second-generation immigrant and native
descendents of these excluded immigrants. Hence, by comparing the two
sets of population projections, we may calculate the number of second-
generation immigrants present each year as a consequence of post-2000
immigration, i.e., the children of first-generation immigrants arriving
after the year 2000. Based on the educational characteristics of recent first-
generation immigrants and estimated educational transition matrices, we
then project the educational characteristics of these post-2000 second-
generation immigrants, and adjust their tax and transfer profiles accord-
ingly, using estimated profiles that distinguish by educational status.










this adjustment. The accounts of current native generations are the
same, as only future generations are affected by the adjustment. As
expected, the projected net tax profiles of post-2000 second-generation
immigrants fall. These adjusted profiles, shown in Figure 3a and b, now
lie slightly below the profiles for natives. This decline in projected net tax
contributions raises the estimated fiscal imbalance. The effect is not
large, in part because this difference in second-generation profiles has
only a gradual influence over time. Still, we view this adjustment as
appropriate, and treat this set of assumptions as the base case for our
subsequent policy simulations.
In addition to the scenario just considered, in which all taxes and
transfers are adjusted, the last two columns also present the accounts for
the first future generation under the two alternative scenarios in which
only taxes or only transfers are adjusted. When taxes and transfers are
adjusted, a 7.3-percent increase in taxes and cut in transfers is required
to restore fiscal balance. A 10.1-percent increase in taxes or a 25.8-
percent cut in transfers would be required if either set of instruments
were adjusted separately. While all three policies have similar effects on
current generations, note that the policy of adjusting only taxes falls
more heavily on males, while that of adjusting only transfers falls more
heavily on females.
These results suggest that the traditional method of computing genera-
tional accounts, which treats the entire population as native-born, has
not been significantly biased in its conclusions regarding overall fiscal
balance. However, with the new technique, we are now in a position to
evaluate the impact of changes in immigration policy.
6. THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION
What impact would a change in immigration have on the fiscal burdens
of current and future generations? To address this question, we must
first specify the exact change in policy envisioned. While we do not
consider it a realistic policy option, simply halting all immigration after
the year 2000 provides a useful polar case for analyzing the impact of less
extreme changes in policy as well. Thus, we consider such a policy,
based on the alternative set of projections discussed in the previous
section.
It is also necessary to specify a fiscal policy environment in which the
change in immigration policy takes place. We consider two such environ-
ments. In the first, the burden of the government's intertemporal fiscal
imbalance falls entirely on future generations. This corresponds to the
simulations reported in Table 1. In the second fiscal environment, gov-Fiscal Effects of U.S. Immigration143
ernment's fiscal policy is assumed to change immediately, with taxes
being raised and transfers being cut on all generations from the base year
onward, until the government's fiscal imbalance is eliminated under the
current immigration scenario. This policy leaves the currentnewborn
and first future native generations with roughly the same generational
accounts, adjusted for growth, with the very slight difference formales
being attributable to differences in life expectancy. Note, too, thatthis
policy implies a smaller burden on future generations than doesthe
other scenario.
The effects of these alternative fiscal scenarios may be seen by compar-
ing the first two and last two columns in Table 2, which presentthe
burdens on current and future generations of males and females under
the alternative fiscal policies. The first row under "future generations"
corresponds to the case of present immigration policy. Reading across
the table, we observe that stabilizing fiscal policy would require an in-
crease of $2,300 in the burden on newbornmales, and $1,800 in the
burden on newborn females, corresponding to an immediate 1.3-percent
increase in all taxes and a 1.3-percent cut in all transfers. Thisimmediate
adjustment would permit a significant drop in the burdens on members
of future generations, who, by assumption, would also face a 1.3-
percent increase in all taxes and a 1.3-percent cut in all transfers.11
Now consider the impact of eliminating immigration.12 Eliminating
immigrants also eliminates the taxes they pay and the transfers they
receive. It may also have some impact on the level of government pur-
chases, depending on what we wish to assume about the nature of these
goods (i.e., "public" goods vs. "private" goods) and how their provision
changes with population. Initially, we assume that government pur-
chase profiles remain constant, meaning, for example, that a reduction
in the population size with no change in population structure wifiinduce
a reduction of equal proportion inthe level of government purchases.
Under this assumption about government purchases, the impact of
eliminating immigration is shown in the second set of numbers labeled
"Future generations" in Table 2. For the fiscal scenario that allocates
the entire burden to future generations, eliminating immigration helps
the remaining population, lowering the burden on males by $4,800
and the burden on females by $3,700. Thus, immigration acts against the
11 For this and all other simulations in the second set of columns in Table 2, the "%
change" refers to the change for future generations relative to the baseline with no change
in fiscal policy or immigration.
12 This policy simulation also eliminates the return migration of immigrants already in the
United States.TABLE 2
Generational Accounts: The Effects of Immigration(a)
(a) In thousands of dollars; r = .06, g = .012. Base year 1998.
Age
Initial fiscal balance assumption
No change Immediate change
Males Females Males Females
0 106.9 71.0 109.2 72.8
5 133.9 86.7 136.7 88.8
10 165.3 105.4 168.5 107.9
15 204.9 128.7 208.8 131.6
20 249.9 155.0 254.4 158.4
25 277.6 169.1 282.6 172.8
30 277.0 164.8 282.1 168.4
35 264.1 154.3 269.2 157.9
40 236.8 132.6 241.8 136.2
45 185.7 91.4 190.4 95.0
50 117.6 39.0 122.0 42.5
55 36.2 -22.1 40.2 -18.7
60 -49.0 -83.6 -45.3 -80.2
65 -111.9 -126.8 -108.5 -123.7
70 -118.3 -128.7 -115.4 -126.0
75 -107.6 -119.0 -105.3 -116.8
80 -91.4 -101.6 -89.6 -99.9
85 -78.2 -81.7 -76.9 -80.4
90 -59.0 -60.3 -58.1 -59.3
Immigration policy
assumption
Burdens on future generations
(and percent changes in taxes and transfers)
Males Females Males Females
Baseline 120.1 80.9 109.5 72.7
% change 7.3 1.3
No immigration after 2000 115.3 77.2 102.4 67.3
% change 4.6 -2.5
No immigration after 2000;
defense a public good
123.6 83.5 110.8 73.7
% change 9.2 2.1Fiscal Effects of U.S. Immigration145
restoration of fiscal balance. This picture is reinforced bythe alternative
assumption that fiscal policy is immediately adjusted toinstitute balance
under present immigration policy. As shown in thetable's last two col-
umns, eliminating immigration nowreduces the burdens on future
males by $7,100 and future females by $5,400.
What explains the difference for the two fiscal policies?It is helpful to
consider this in the context of equation (3), thegovernment's in-
tertemporal budget constraints. Under the "responsible"fiscal policy
scenario, more of the burden is being placed on currentgenerations,
who make up the first term on the left side of equation(3), and less on
future generations, who make up the second term onthe left side.
Immigrants in future generations are primarily new immigrants(whose
presence in the United Stateswould be eliminated by the reform),13
while those in current generations include some newimmigrants but
also all immigrants already present in the United States.Hence, new
immigrants account for a greater fraction of this second termthan of the
first: their fiscal contribution, relative to that of others inthe population,
is weighted more strongly toward futuregenerations. Thus, their aver-
age contribution is lower under thepolicy of immediate adjustment,
which raises burdens on those included in both terms,than under the
policy of "letting future generations pay," which raises burdensonly on
those accounted for by the second term. Therefore, eliminating new
immigrants from the population has a more favorable impactunder the
scenario of immediate fiscal adjustment.14
This conclusion hinges, of course, on our assumptionregarding the
change in government purchases,15 and in some sense represents an
extreme case in which there are no economiesof scale in the consump-
tion of the goods and services government provides.While this may be a
reasonable assumption for some government-providedgoods and ser-
vices, there may be others for which a public-goods natureimplies sig-
nificant economies of scale in consumption. Perhapsthe most likely
13We say "primarily" because, under the policy considered, there wifistill be some second-
generation immigrants born in the future to first-generation immigrantparents who ar-
rived before the elimination of immigration.
14 Indeed, in our earlier paper (Auerbach and Oreopoulos, 1999), we found an even larger
difference between the results corresponding to the "irresponsible"and "responsible"
scenarios, to the extent that extra immigration provided a netfiscal benefit in the former
case. The reason is that, under our previousfiscal projections, the fiscal gap and hence the
net burden on future generations was substantially largerthan is currently projected.
'Recall that only government purchases, not all government spending, isrelevant here,
because transfer payments are already incorporated in thegenerational accounts, and
interest payments are excluded to avoid double counting.146Auerbach & Oreopoulos
candidate for this latter category is spendingon national defense. In
1998, U.S. defense spending was $340 billion,or 23 percent of consump-
tion and investment spending by all levels ofgovernment combined,
down slightly as a percentage compared toyears past. Thus, we con-
sider as an alternative case the assumption thata quarter of all govern-
ment purchases are purely "public" in nature, and do notvary at all with
the size of the immigrant population. Thismay also be somewhat ex-
treme, as one would expect the size of the military and the defense
budget to respond to at least some extent to large changesin population.
On the other hand, there may be other components of federal,state, and
local purchases with a "public" component.
Treating a portion of government purchasesas unrelated to popula-
tion size means that eliminating immigrants hasno impact on this
amount, which wifi make reducing immigrationappear less attractive
from the fiscal perspective. The last set of numbers labeled"future gen-
erations" in Table 2 illustrates the effect of this change inassumption.
Now, under both scenarios, eliminating immigration after theyear 2000
harms the native population. The largest lossesare under the "irresponsi-
bility" scenario, for which future immigrants would beara larger share
of the fiscal burden. In this case, future native males lose$3,500, and
future females lose $2,600. Even these losses, whichmay also be viewed
as the implied gains from having immigrants present, are smaller than
the potential gains these generations would achieve throughimmediate
fiscal balance already considered in the table. Thus, given thatthe immi-
gration policy being considered involvesa much larger change in immi-
gration than is feasible, it appears that simple changesin the level of
immigration would have small fiscal impacts, whencompared to the
overall U.S. fiscal imbalance.
To examine the sensitivity of these conclusions,we consider variations
of two types. In each instance, to keep the number ofcases manageable,
we do not consider the cases in which fiscal adjustment affects allgenera-
tions (corresponding to the second set of columns in Table 2).Table 3
repeats the calculations of Table 2 for different assumptions about the
future fiscal policies to be used to produce fiscal balance.The top panel of
the table, reproduced from Table 2,assumes equal percentage changes in
taxes (which are increased) and transfers (whichare reduced). The second
panel assumes that only tax increasesare used, while the third panel
assumes that only cuts in transfers are used. While the numbers differ
across the three simulations, these differences are small and the pat-
terns are the same.
Table 4 presents the results for alternative interest-rate andgrowth-
rate assumptions, reporting the percentage change in taxes andtransfersTABLE 3
Burdens on Future Generations:








No immigration after 2000 115.3 77.2
% change 4.6
No immigration after 2000; 123.6 83.5





No immigration after 2000 115.7 77.0
% change 6.3
No Immigration after 2000; 124.3 83.1





No Immigration after 2000 114.4 77.7
% change 17.0
No Immigration after 2000; 121.6 84.5
defense a public good
% change 34.0
(a) In thousands of dollars; r = .06, g = .012. Base year1998.148Auerbach & Oreopoulos
TABLE 4
Percentage Change in Taxes and Transfers: SensitivityAnalysis
Change (%)
mt.Growth No immigrationNo immigration after 2000;
rate rate Baseline after 2000 defense a public good
for the three immigration scenarios. As thetable shows, the percentage
increase (decrease) in taxes (transfers) neededto satisfy the govern-
ment's budget constraint falls both with increasingdiscount rate and
with increasing rate of productivity growth. Thatlatter result reflects the
fact that tax revenues wifi growmore quickly. The former result is due to
the pattern of projected taxes and spending, withcash-flow surpluses in
the short run followed by cash-flow deficits.High rates of return would
allow these short-run surpluses to translateinto very large accumula-
tions that would be more than sufficientto cover long-run needs, mak-
ing the current imbalance negative fora 9-percent rate of return, one that
is perhaps too high to provoke seriouscontemplation.
Moving from top to bottom in the table,we see that immigration is
generally most helpful, and reducing immigrationmost harmful, when
the baseline fiscal imbalance is large. Fora discount rate of 3 percent,
reducing immigration raises burdens under bothassumptions regarding
the response of defense spending. Fora 6-percent discount rate, the
central case, reducing immigration is helpfulif defense spending falls,
but harmful if it does not. Fora 9-percent discount rate, reducing immi-
gration is always helpful, because it leaves fewerindividuals to divide
the fiscal dividend.
To summarize our finding thus far,reducing immigration might in-
crease or reduce future fiscal burdens, with theoutcome depending pri-
marily on how large overall future burdenswifi be. However, the rate of
immigration is only one possible immigrationpolicy change. One might
expect that adjusting the mix of immigrants towardthe more highly
.03 .007 20.8 21.1 24.8
.012 14.7 14.9 18.9
.017 9.0 9.1 13.3
.06 .007 11.7 8.9 13.5
.012 7.3 4.6 9.2
.017 2.0 0.8 3.8
.09 .007 14.7 22.7 16.9
.012 16.8 24.6 18.8
.017 21.3 29.2 23.4Fiscal Effects of U.S. Immigration149
skilled could have a significant fiscal impact, based on thelarge differ-
ences in fiscal profiles byeducational status reported in NRC (1997). This
is also the conclusion reached by Storesletten (2000) in a recentsimulation
analysis. Hence, we turn now to consider the impact of this typeof policy
shift.
7. A CHANGE IN THE COMPOSITIONOF THE NEW
IMMIGRANT POPULATION
Immigration policy based on the "typical" immigrant ignores theconsid-
erable heterogeneity of the immigration population. Though recentim-
migrants, on average, are less educated than their U.S.counterparts,
they include among their number higher percentages ofboth college
graduates and those without high school diplomas. For example, among
recent male immigrants to the United States, 36.2 percenthave not com-
pleted high school, and 30.5 percent are college graduates. For native
males, the corresponding percentages are 14.4 percent and 26.3 percent,
respectively (NRC, 1997, p. 183). Thus, given that the compositionof the
immigrant population is not immutable, an evaluation ofthe fiscal ef-
fects of immigration is seriously incomplete if it does not alsoconsider
the effects of changes in the education levels of immigrants.
As in the case of changes in rate of immigrationalready discussed, we
start with an extreme case here, for the sake ofclarity, not realism. We
suppose that, beginning after the year 2000,the United States alters its
immigration policy so that all subsequent immigrants have at least some
education beyond high school. We assume that all first-generationimmi-
grants arriving after 2000 have the tax and transferprofiles estimated for
such immigrants. We also consider the additional effect thatthis change
in skill mix has on the educational status offuture second-generation
immigrants born to these post-2000 first-generation immigrants.
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 5, under the assump-
tion that there is no immediate fiscal policy changeand that, ultimately,
taxes and transfers of future generations are alladjusted proportionally.
The table presents four sets of results. The first panelcorresponds to the
base case from earlier tables. The second presents the newpolicy, incor-
porating the effects on first-generation immigrants. Thethird panel pres-
ents the full policy impact, taking into account alsothe effect on future
second-generation immigrants. The fourth panel presents the fullresults
for a less extreme intermediate policy that applies the newrule to half
the new immigrant population, leaving the remaininghalf of immi-150 Auerbach & Oreopoulos
TABLE 5




Future generations 120.1 80.9
Males Females
% change 3.4
Policy applied to only 50% of the new immigrant population
Newborns 106.9 71.0
Future generations 110.5 73.5
%change 1.9
(a) In thousands of dollars; r = .06, g = .0 12. Base year 1998.
grants as projected under the base case. This intermediate policy would,
for example, increase the share of new 25-year-old immigrants with
more than a high-school education from 39 to 70 percent, while reducing
the share with less than a high-school education from 37 to 18 percent.
As the table shows, the full policy would havea significant fiscal
impact on native cohorts, reducing the burden on future generations by
$19,000 for males and $14,600 for females,an effect substantially larger
than would be produced by im.mediate fiscal reforms to eliminate the
imbalance between current and future generations, and much larger still
than the impact of eliminating immigration entirely. Even the partial
policy would reduce future burdens by $9,600 and $7,400, respectively,
nearly the impact of eliminating the current fiscal imbalance.
% change
All new 1st-generation immigrants
7.3
with education > HS
Newborns 106.9 71.0
Future generations 101.9 66.9
%change 2.9
Incorporating induced 2nd-generation immigrant effects
Newborns 106.9 71.0
Future generations 101.1 66.3Fiscal Effects of U.S. Immigration151
8. CONCLUSIONS
Our findings suggest a number of conclusions. First, even an enormous
change in the rate of inmiigrationsimulated as an outright immi-
gration ban after the year 2000has a small impact on fiscal balance
relative to the size of the overall imbalance itself. Thus, more realistic
changes in the level of immigration should be viewed neither as a major
source of the existing imbalance nor as apotential solution to it.
Second, the net fiscal cost or benefit from immigration depends on the
extent to which the existing fiscal imbalance will be borneby future
generations. Because new immigrants and their offspring represent a
larger fraction of future generations than of present ones,shifting the
burden onto future generations also shifts it, relatively, onto new immi-
grants. When a policy of "fiscal responsibility" is followed,with taxes
and/or transfers adjusted immediately on all generations to restore the
government's intertemporal budget constraint, the fiscal gain from immi-
gration is reduced, or the loss increased.
Third, the overall fiscal impact of immigration is unclear.Whether
there is a gain or a loss depends on the extent to which government
purchases rise with the immigrant population. We considered two ex-
treme cases. When defense spending rises in proportion topopulation
size, immigration worsens the fiscal imbalance. When defensespending
is a "pure" public good, unaffected by population size,immigration
lessens the fiscal imbalance.
Finally, a change in immigration policy that alters the composition,
rather than the level, of immigration does have the potential toreduce
the fiscal burdens on future generations. A policy that wouldearmark
half of the current level of immigration flow for individuals with atleast
some postsecondary education wouldhave roughly the same impact on
future generations as a policy that eliminated the fiscal gap. Thus, as
concerns fiscal policy, altering the mixof immigrants appears to be a
more important policy decision than thealtering the level.
In producing these results, we have also extended the methodologyof
generational accounting to accommodate heterogeneity among members
of current and future generations other than the distinction by sex that
has been present in prior work. To deal with the very different taxand
transfer profiles of immigrants and natives, we developed an alternative
method of calculating fiscal imbalance that does not require the assump-
tion of equal percentage changes in lifetime tax burdens. An obvious
application of this methodology would be to the construction of genera-
tional accounts that recognize other forms of heterogeneity within gen-
erations, notably by lifetime income class.152Auerbach & Oreopoulos
APPENDIX
This appendix describes the method used to construct profiles broken
down by age, sex, and nativity, and the further adjustment of thepro-
files of post-2000 second-generation immigrants to allow for their differ-
ences from current second-generation immigrants.
A.1 Combining Profiles from Two Sources
Our first step is to combine two sets of taxtransfer profiles,one broken
down only by age and sex and the other broken down byage and nativity,
to generate estimated profiles broken down by age, sex, and nativity. Our
procedure is the same for each age, and so age is omitted from the discus-
sion. The algorithm uses data from three sources. The first set of data is
population projections, provided by Barry Edmonston. These projections
are broken down by nativity i (equal to 1, 2, or 3 for first-generation
immigrants, second-generation immigrants, and all others) and sexj (tak-
ing a value of m for males orf for females), P. The second set of data is the
tax and transfer profiles by sex, used by Gokhale et al. (GPS, 1999). These
profiles, r (j = m,f) are expressed as ratios, normalized by the values for
40-year-old males. The third set of data is the tax and transfer profiles by
nativity, constructed by Lee and Miller (1997), whichwe denote T (i = 1,
2, 3). We seek to use these data to construct normalized profiles fortaxes
and transfer by sex and nativity, r.
Before applying our algorithm to combine these two sets of profiles,it
is necessary for us to make their categories compatible. GPS applypro-
files that have been used and described in earlier generationalaccount-
ing work for the United States, for example Auerbach, Gokhale, and
Kotlikoff (1991). Each male and female at eachage is assigned a profile,
relative to that of a 40-year-old male, for six categories oftaxes (labor
income, FICA, excise, capital income, property, and seignorage) and
seven categories of transfer payments (OASDI, Medicare, Medicaid, UI,
general welfare, AFDC, and food stamps). Forpurposes of estimating
government expenditures (which are not included in the generational
accounts), the methodology uses separate federal and state and local
government purchase profiles. Our calculations are based on thesesame
tax, transfer, and government consumption groupings, althoughwe
wish to distinguish by immigrant status as well.
To construct profiles for immigrants, we use averageper capita
amounts from Lee and Miller (1997) for first- and second-generation immi-
grants and natives, for males and females combined.16 However, these
16See also National Research Council (1997) for a detailed discussion of these profiles.Fiscal Effects of U.S. Immigration153
profile categories are broader than the ones used by GPS. For taxes, these
are: state and federal income, FICA, property,sales, and federal business
and excise taxes. For transfers, 25 different local, state, and federal pro-
grams are used: OASDI, Medicare,Medicaid (noninstitutional), Medicaid
(institutional), SSI, AFDC, school lunch, food stamps, Special Supple-
mental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), en-
ergy assistance, rent subsidy, publichousing, earned income tax credit,
unemployment insurance, elementary and high school, bilingual educa-
tion, public college, federal student aid, incarceration costs, federal retire-
ment, military retirement, railroad retirement, workers'compensation
state and local retirement, and refugee assistance.
Lee and Miller (1997) aggregate individuals into five-year age groups,
beginning with 0-4 and ending with 80+. To convert their data into
individual age amounts, we assume that individual cohorts in each five-
year age grouping have identical values. In some caseswhere the rela-
tive immigrant profiles of Lee and Miller were zero for cohorts below age
15 while profiles for males and females were non-zero, those cohorts
under 15 were assumed to have the same relative immigrant profile
values as the 15-19 group.
The categories are then aggregated to fit those used by GPS by adding
the per capita amounts. For example, federal and state income taxes are
combined into one category, while institutional and noninstitutional
Medicaid expenditures are combined into another. Many of the smaller
categories from Lee and Miller (1997) were reclassified as part of either
state or federal government consumption.
To construct the normalized tax and transfer profiles by sex and nativ-
ity, r, we start by requiring that they be consistent with the two setsof
profiles we already have; that is,
+ rP T1(P + P)
r3 P3 + rPT(P, + P)' mm
rJPJ + r7P?+ r7P7= r(P7 + P7+ P7),j = m,f.
This gives us four equations in the six unknowns r. To obtainthe
two additional equations needed for a solution, we assumethat the






i = 1,2. (A3)
Using these six equations for each age group, we solve for the relative
profiles by sex, immigrant status, and age, which are used in turn to
compute the generational accounts.
A.2 Distinguishing Immigrants by Education Level
Our base-case analysis adjusts the profiles of post-2000 second-genera-
tion immigrants to take account of the fact that theyare likely to differ
from current second-generation immigrants with respect to education
level. This adjustment requires three further steps: first, the construc-
tion of profiles that vary by education level; second, the derivation of
population weights corresponding to each education category, tocon-
struct new aggregate profiles; and finally, the identification of the share
of future second-generation immigrants associated with post-2000 imnmi-
gration, i.e., the children of post-2000 first-generation immigrants.
While we adjust profiles only for post-2000 second-generation imnrni-
grants in our baseline analysis, our alternative simulation of a policy of
accepting more highly educated immigrants after the year 2000 also
requires adjustment of future first-generation profiles. Thus,we need
profiles for both groups that distinguish by level of education,as well as
by age and sex.
These profiles are created in a similar way to that described above.
Using the same notation, we now add a third dimension of educational
status to the profiles we already have, and to the population shares. We
distinguish the profiles for first- and second-generation immigrants by
those with less than high school education, those with high school edu-
cation, and those with more than high school education:
rP+ryePr T(P + piie)
+ rP yi(pi+ P) /
We want to solve for the profiles rand r'. From the previous section,
we already have the imputed values r. From Lee and Miller (1997), we
have the tax and transfer profiles already used above thatare broken
down by nativity, T', as well as profiles also broken down by level of
education, T,e. Two additional assumptions are required to obtaina
unique solution for the profiles we seek. First, we assume that the rela-
tive profiles in each immigrant group are the same for each education
subgroup:
i = 1,2,e = <HS, HS, >HS.(A4)Second, we assume the malefemale split within eacheducation group
is the same for the specific immigrant group as awhole:
pi'epi
peP'
From (A4), (A5), and (A6) we can then solve forthe relative profiles of
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= 1,2,e = <HS, HS, >HS. (A5)
= 1,2,e = <HS, HS, >HS. (A6)
= 1,2,e = <HS, HS, >HS,s = m,f. (A7)
To use the profiles in equation (A7) to construct aggregateprofiles for
post-2000 second-generation immigrants, we need populationweights
for the different education categories. We assume thatsuch immigrants
are the children of first-generationimmigrants with the educational-
status breakdown of current first-generation immigrantsbetween the
ages of 25 and 45, as estimated by Leeand Miller (1997). We then use the
intergenerational educational transition matrices of Lee and Miller to
calculate the share of post-2000 second-generation immigrantsin each
education category, and use these weights to constructprofiles for post-
2000 second-generation immigrants.
To estimate the share of post-2000 second-generationimmigrants, we
difference the two sets of population projections providedby Barry
Edmonston, corresponding to current immigrationpolicy and a cutoff of
immigration in the year 2000. If we ignore changes in emigrationbetween
the two scenarios, then the differences in first- andsecond-generation
immigrants identify the number of first-generationimmigrants in the
population after 2000 who arrive after 2000, and theirsecond-generation
offspring. In our base-case calculations, we assign separateprofiles to the
post-2000 second-generation population.
For the alternative simulation in which we assume achange in the
educational mix of first generation immigrants, we construct new aggre-
gate profiles for post-2000 first-generation immigrants,based on the new
assumed population shares for each education category, and thenrevise
the aggregate profiles for post-2000 second-generationimmigrants as
well, applying the educational transition matrices tothe new assumed
first-generation population shares.156 Auerbach & Oreopoulos
REFERENCES
Auerbach, AlanJ., Jagadeesh Gokhale, and Laurencej. Kotlikoff (1991). "Genera-
tional Accounts: A Meaningful Alternative to Deficit Accounting." In Tax Pol-
icy and the Economy, vol. 5, D. Bradford (Ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Auerbach, Alan J., and Laurence J. Kotlikoff (1999). "The Methodology of Gen-
erational Accounting." In Generational Accounting around the World, A. Auer-
bach, L. Kotlikoff, and W. Leibfritz (Eds.). Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Auerbach, Alan J., and Philip Oreopoulos (1999). "Analyzing the Fiscal Impact
of U.S. Immigration." American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings,May:
176-180.
Bonin, Holger, Bemd RaffelhUschen, and Jan Walliser (1998). "Can Immigration
Alleviate the Demographic Burden?" Universitat Freiburg, June.
Borjas, George J. (1994). "The Economics of Immigration." Journal of Economic
Literature, December: 1607-1717.
Card, David (1996). "Immigration Inflows, Native Outflows, and the Local
Labor Market." Princeton Industrial Relations Section Working Paperno.
368. November.
Fehr, Hans, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff (1999). "Generational Accounting in Gen-
eral Equilibrium." In Generational Accounting around the World, A. Auerbach,L.
Kotlikoff, and W. Leibfritz (Eds.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gokhale, Jagadeesh, Benjamin R. Page, and John R. Sturrock (1999). "Genera-
tional Accounting for the United States: An Update." In Generational Accounting
around the World, A. Auerbach, L. Kotlikoff, and W. Leibfritz (Eds.). Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Lee, Ronald D., and Timothy Miller (1997). "Immigrants and Their Descen-
dants." Project on the Economic Demography of Interage Income Realloca-
tion, Department of Demography, University of California, Berkeley.
National Research Council (1997). The New Americans. Washington: National
Academy Press.
Storesletten, Kjetil (2000). "Sustaining Fiscal Policy through Immigration."Forth-
coming in Journal of Political Economy.